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ON OPTIMIZING DDI ALERTS AND LIABILITY UNDER CDS: 
THE AUTHORS RESPOND 
MICHAEL D. GREENBERG AND M. SUSAN RIDGELY* 
There are two threshold points on which we respectfully disagree with 
the various commentators.  First, our focus in writing our paper was neither 
to define drug-drug interaction (“DDI”), nor to specify the details of how a 
clinically significant DDI list would be put together.  Those are questions that 
we leave to the clinicians and clinical scholars, who will be the architects of 
any future DDI list, as well as the pilots and navigators in any future process 
that produces such a list.  Nor was it our aim to advocate for the 
development and adoption of a DDI list, nor to grapple with the deep 
philosophical, statistical, and practical questions about what such a list 
might mean, what it might look like, and what kinds of implicit risk trade-offs 
would necessarily be embedded in it.  Our original task was much more 
limited: namely, to identify and assess the relative merits of public policy 
options to address the legitimate DDI liability concerns of physicians, 
healthcare organizations and vendors. We are grateful to the commentators 
for offering their views on the five policy options we described, and for 
pointing out some other possibilities that we did not explicitly address. 
We did take away two important messages from the commentators, 
however.  First, that the original draft title of our paper may have been 
overbroad; and second, that we did not provide enough background 
information about the ONC project that was the context for our effort. 
In response to the first issue, we revised the title of our paper to be clear 
that the focus of our legal analysis was on drug-drug interaction within 
clinical decision support and not on CDS more broadly.1  As was pointed 
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 1. The original title of our article was Too Many Alerts, Too Much Liability: Sorting 
Through the Malpractice Implications of Clinical Decision Support. 
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out by both Ms. Daniel2 and Dr. Koppel3 in their responses, the public policy 
options we outlined in our paper are not generalizable to all types and 
aspects of CDS, and therefore it was important for the title of our paper to 
reflect our own focus on DDI specifically. 
To expand briefly on this point, CDS systems clearly involve many 
different features and functional attributes, and our own liability analysis (by 
design) focuses on only one of them, which is the problem of DDI alerting.  
Dr. Koppel in particular is absolutely right in pointing out that some of the 
other functional attributes of CDS systems also pose serious liability 
concerns.  Without addressing any of those other problems directly, what we 
would say is that the DDI issue is clearly a focal point for the dissatisfaction 
of many clinicians with CDS; a major liability and adoption concern for 
vendors, clinicians, and payers alike; and a major safety concern for 
patients.  Consequently, and in our view, it makes sense to address the DDI 
problem discretely and carefully, since it has become one of the central 
stumbling blocks for CDS in fulfilling any of the quality and efficiency 
promises that the technology theoretically offers. 
On a different point, there was interest among some of the 
commentators in the Advancing Clinical Decision Support project funded by 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
(“ONC”). The project is described on the RAND Corporation website at 
http://www.rand.org/health/projects/clinical-decision-support.html. This was 
a contract between the ONC and the RAND Corporation, along with 
collaborators from Partners Health Care of Massachusetts (including Dr. 
David Bates, who authored one of the commentaries).  The major tasks in 
this multi-faceted project included: (1) preparing resources on best practices 
in CDS design and CDS implementation for broad dissemination; (2) 
producing an open online platform for sharing CDS knowledge artifacts 
(such as alerts, order sets, etc.) among EHR vendors and/or provider 
organizations; (3) developing a “clinically significant” DDI list and a legal 
brief about the liability implications of using the clinically important DDI list; 
and (4) developing a process to engage professional organizations in 
selecting targets for “meaningful use” of CDS by specialists.  A full report 
from the project will be available soon on the RAND webpage. 
The third goal of the project (which was to develop a clinically significant 
drug-drug interaction list) morphed during the project into the less 
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contentious task of establishing a smaller set of “high utility” drug interaction 
warnings (that is, those drug pairs that should never be co-prescribed and 
would be candidates for “hard stop” alerts in any CDS system).  Participants 
are also developing a set of “low utility” DDIs (those that might be 
suppressed without compromising standards of care).  These are the “two 
lists” referred to by Dr. Bates in his commentary.4 
The development of the high utility list was accomplished through a 
scientific review of the literature, interviews with knowledge base vendors, 
development of criteria for judging the utility of DDIs, and then deliberations 
and consensus of an expert panel.  Taken together, the high utility and low 
utility DDI lists will help to optimize CDS systems.  However, even the expert 
panel members acknowledge that the high utility DDI “pairs” they agreed on 
represent only about 1% of the current DDI alerts. 
Many of the more prevalent DDI alerts cause more harm overall, but 
their potential to harm depends upon patient characteristics, drug dosages 
and timing, and concomitant conditions (such as a lower-than-normal 
amount of potassium in the blood).  Addressing these would require 
investment in methods to make DDI alerts conditional on other patient data 
in the electronic health record.  Therefore, the combination of the high utility 
and low utility DDI lists will be a necessary but very preliminary step to 
achieve the overall goals of the project.  As pointed out by Dr. Bates, Dr. 
Koppel, and Ms. Hoffman and Mr. Pogurski, more work is necessary. 
We were a bit confused, however, by Ms. Hoffman and Mr. Pogurski’s 
commentary which first argued that “even a group of highly qualified experts 
are unlikely to agree upon a list of always contraindicated DDIs”5 (which the 
Advancing Clinical Decision Support project has already done) but then goes 
on to praise the Netherlands for having developed a single national 
interaction alert database that underpins all CDS systems in the country.6 
We would like to respond briefly to a few other points raised by the 
commentators.  One point raised by Ms. Daniel was the observation that 
some of the liability issues and practical concerns surrounding DDI and CDS 
systems might well be addressed through creative refinement in other 
aspects of CDS technology, notably focusing on a human factors approach 
to “user-centered design,” which perhaps could ameliorate the problem of 
alert fatigue.7 That point is well taken, and is worthy of serious 
consideration. On the other hand, we would suggest that any new CDS 
 
 4. David W. Bates, Clinical Decision Support and the Law: The Big Picture, 5 ST. LOUIS U. 
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 7. Daniel, supra note 2, at 331-32. 
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refinement that shifts the burden of information processing and decision-
making away from providers and onto automation, will also shift the locus 
of responsibility and of risk management, again away from providers and 
onto automation.  By extension, vendors could easily face more liability risk.  
Without analyzing all of the downstream implications, we note that one 
implication is that fear of liability could influence CDS system design in the 
future, in ways that are subtle and not in keeping with the laudable goal of 
an optimized user interface. This is not likely to be an easy problem for 
government to address. In our view, a simple focus on human factors 
engineering is unlikely to sidestep concerns about liability and risk 
allocation. 
A second point raised by Ms. Daniel involves the potential for 
contracting between CDS vendors and CDS users, to realign liability risks to 
the parties best suited to mitigate them.8  This is also a suggestion worth 
considering.  But it too presents a host of practical and conceptual 
problems.  Chief among them is that it leaves the existing liability landscape 
unchanged: the potential still exists for an entire category of tort lawsuits for 
patient injuries associated with DDI warnings either not given by CDS, or 
given by CDS but then ignored by providers.  A contract solution that 
reallocates risk between vendors and providers ignores the deeper social 
welfare question, which is this: would CDS be better, and patients safer 
overall, if fewer but better calibrated DDI warnings were in fact generated by 
CDS systems?  And if so, are we more likely to reach that optimized CDS 
solution, and the corresponding reduction in patient risk, by fundamentally 
reducing tort liability for related injuries? 
One further thought to close.  For a moment, set aside all of the clinical 
issues involved in building a DDI list, all of the technical issues involved in 
designing robust CDS systems, and all of the legal issues involved in 
determining liability.  What remains is an underlying, deep problem of risk 
management, risk sharing, and social welfare.  Any solution to DDI, and to 
CDS, is likely to involve a complex optimization of trade-offs in clinical risk 
and clinical outcomes.  A good solution will help society to become more 
effective in preventing some important categories of injury, but with the 
inevitable trade-off of not focusing on other categories of (hopefully less 
frequent and less impactful) injury.  It seems likely to us that a good solution 
will require, first and foremost, a recognition that difficult trade-offs in risk 
have to be made, because failing to make them imposes even greater costs 
on society as a whole.  In some sense, questions about liability (and who 
ought to pay for risk) ideally ought to follow after we solve the basic risk 
optimization problem, rather than preceding it.  Unfortunately, that’s not the 
 
 8. Id. at 8. 
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world in which we currently live.  Like the other commentators in this issue, 
we offer our own ideas about liability in the hopes of contributing to useful 
incremental reform, to the availability of better CDS in the near term, and to 
reducing the occurrence of preventable injury and needless human 
suffering. 
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